Artillery is a god of modern war. Josef Stalin
Here is a story about one of the U.S. Army’s finest units that endured a day so hard, many survivors won’t talk about it even today. On July 11th, 1991 in Kuwait, the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment (Blackhorse) suffered the single worst non-combat accident in U.S. Army history. By the time it was all over, more than 100 vehicles were damaged or destroyed, nearly sixty Soldiers had been wounded, and three more died.
The Blackhorse is a proud unit with a storied history that stretches back to 1901. The regiment has served around the globe, from the deserts of northern Mexico in 1916 to the jungles of Vietnam. I am very proud to have shared a small piece of that history. As a young cavalry scout in the 1980s, I spent four years serving with the regiment.
A storm in the desert
This story begins with the end of the war against Iraq in February 1991, when U.S. and allied forces liberated Kuwait. Several hundred Blackhorse Soldiers took part in the operation, most of them cavalry scouts of 2nd Squadron. But most of the regiment stayed behind in Europe to train replacements.
Spec. Robert Winn served as a cavalry scout with India Troop in Bad Hersfeld, Germany. He was interviewed by a Stars and Stripes reporter about how he felt about having to miss the war. Winn gave voice to a common feeling within the ranks: “As far as I’m concerned, and I can probably speak for the members of my platoon, we’re mostly disappointed with the fact that we’re not going.” 1 Many of the Blackhorse troopers in Germany shared the same emotion.
After the war, America’s service members returned victoriously to their home stations, leaving only a handful of troops in Kuwait. With most of the combat units gone, the Army left a set of vehicles and equipment for a brigade combat team at an unused warehouse facility near the western shore of Kuwait Bay. This complex, Camp Doha, became a major base for the U.S. Army Central Command Element-Kuwait.
The orders came from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on May 16th, 1991. As part of Operation Positive Force, the 11th ACR would replace a brigade of the 3rd Armored Division slated to rotate home. There were only a handful of heavy units that had not deployed for Desert Storm. The regiment’s high state of readiness and training made it the obvious – and arguably the only – choice for the assignment.
In early June 1991, the entire Blackhorse deployed to Kuwait. Leaving the regiment’s heavy combat equipment at home in Europe, the Soldiers linked up with the pre-positioned stockpiles waiting for them at Doha. Assuming a defensive posture, the regiment maintained a high alert status during the semi-peace that endured after the defeat of Iraqi forces in Desert Storm.
An abysmal situation confronted the regiment’s 3,600 Soldiers at Doha. The Iraqi army had occupied the facilities during the war, and in retreat had looted everything possible. Running water was in short supply, and living conditions were austere at best. The combat equipment stored at Doha had been parked and abandoned after Desert Storm.
A dual threat confronted the Blackhorse. The unsettled situation in Iraq dictated a high degree of readiness. The possibility of local terrorism ruled out storing ammo stockpiles off-site. Under direction of Central Command, the regiment’s leadership decided to maintain ammo storage on vehicles, on pallets, and in nearby containers. 2
Ready around the clock
Standing on alert was a mission the Blackhorse understood. During the Cold War, the regiment maintained combat readiness around the clock in Europe. M1A1 tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles were always loaded with live main gun ammunition. 3 Machine gun ammunition was locked and secured in shipping containers near the vehicles on the hardstands. The rest of the war stocks were stored at heavily-guarded sites a short drive away from the regiment’s home stations in central Germany.
Working with ammo aboard the tanks and Bradleys was second nature for Blackhorse troopers. In Kuwait, the regiment uploaded live ammunition on the vehicles like it had in Europe. But now, additional ammunition was stored nearby in shipping containers. Also at Camp Doha, ordnance of all types – from rifle ammunition to TOW missiles and artillery rounds – was stored on the hardstands (also known as motor pools or track parks) close to the unit lines.
On the hardstand at Camp Doha, every track, tank, and truck had its own designated parking spot. Vehicles were grouped by units lined up in orderly rows. Driveways separated the different units, allowing space for vehicles and Soldiers to move around. It all looked very neat and efficient because it was. Each squadron had its own hardstand.
The big guns
The Cold War era armored cavalry regiment (ACR) ranked among the most powerful combined arms formations in the world. Designed for the long-range reconnaissance fight, the ACR possessed a finely tuned balance of firepower, mobility, and protection. The regiment’s three ground and one air cavalry squadron were capable of independent action against a much larger enemy force.
A self-propelled artillery unit of eight M109 howitzers (How Battery) was assigned to each ground squadron. The guns were each accompanied by a Field Artillery Armored Support Vehicle (FAASV). If a Blackhorse commander needed fire support, he didn’t need to stand in line. He simply called Redleg 4 on the squadron radio net, and told the gunners where to shoot.
The M109s carried on-board ammunition for their big guns, about thirty-six rounds each. The crew could shoot using this ammo, and then move out to a new position. This type of firing was called “shoot and scoot.” But for sustained work, the FAASV backed up to its howitzer and supplied ammo to the gun crew. The FAASV was built on the chassis of the 109 and carried about ninety-two rounds in the ammo racks. At Doha in July 1991, all of these vehicles were combat-loaded with 155mm ammunition.
Many kinds of ammunition were available for the 155mm howitzer. One of the most common was the high explosive round, which detonated in one blast. Another type was the Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition round (DPICM). This round was a kind of storage container for shaped charge grenades, called submunitions. Dozens of these fist-size rounds were packed inside the shell.
The submunitions ejected from the DPICM round, falling from the sky onto the top surfaces of armored fighting vehicles, trucks, whatever was beneath them. They were dual-purpose, also working against infantry in bunkers and other ground fortifications. So instead of eight big explosions from How Battery’s guns, the target was blanketed with hundreds of submunitions, each able to penetrate 2.5 inches of armor.
From Germany to Iraq
During the Cold War, NATO expected to fight a defensive battle against much larger Warsaw Pact armored forces. So the Army fielded weapons and ammunition to level the field. The DPICM round was an important – actually critical – force multiplier.
The Army developed another specialized munition to channelize and slow down advancing enemy forces. This was the Family of Scatterable Mines (FASCAM), informally called “the instant minefield.” Artillery batteries carried FASCAMs in their ammo loads and fired them on order.
Like the DPICM, the FASCAMs were nested inside 155mm projectiles and both munitions dispersed above the target. There was one big difference. Instead of exploding on impact, FASCAMs functioned as antitank mines once on the ground. Prior to firing, gun crews set timers on the mines to self-destruct after a specified time period, from hours to several days.
A key role was planned for DPICM and FASCAM to slow down and smash Warsaw Pact armored formations. Firing thousands of rounds, the artillery would have showered the enemy with a steel rain of submunitions.
When the Army deployed to war against Iraq in 1991, FASCAMs, and especially DPICM rounds, played an important role in support of allied ground forces. Capt. David Brown commanded an M109 battery during Desert Storm. In a television interview, he later described the DPICM round’s effectiveness in combat: 5
“The … destruction of [DPICM] is almost beyond belief without actually experiencing it falling on you. The devastation that occurs on equipment and other things when those shaped charges goes [sic] off is almost intolerable to survive under a barrage of DPICM. That is the munition of choice on the battlefield.”
Before the inferno
The daily average temperature for July in Kuwait was 116 degrees (F), and with the humidity factored in, it easily felt like 130 (F) or higher in the afternoon. Anything exposed to direct sunlight heated up incredibly fast. Just grabbing a wrench off the ground could cause first-degree burns. Inside closed or unventilated containers, the temperature quickly soared above 140 degrees (F).
On July 11th, 1st and 3rd Squadrons were deployed on operations in northern Kuwait. Only about 1,200 Soldiers, 2nd Squadron (Eaglehorse) and small elements from the other squadrons were on duty that day.
The guard force was called “Z Element.” A quick reaction force drawn from the Eaglehorse stood ready around the clock. Sentries manned perimeter towers and checkpoints. It must have felt very familiar to troopers long accustomed to similar duties during border patrol rotations in Germany. 6
As always, crews were on the hardstand that morning pulling maintenance on their vehicles, inspecting ammunition, and performing other tasks to maintain combat readiness. Other troopers were scattered through the large warehouses that served as giant open-bay barracks, offices, and arms rooms. By mid-morning, it was already well over 100 degrees (F) and climbing.
Fire aboard How-25
Early on the 11th, the battery’s Soldiers went to the hardstand for recovery operations from a five-day field exercise. The crew of FAASV How-25 drove their track to the wash rack for cleaning, and by 10 am had it back in position on the battery line. As they continued daily maintenance, the driver noticed smoke inside the vehicle. It was shortly before 10:20 am. Within minutes, he saw a small fire in the track behind some ammo racks and immediately alerted nearby Soldiers.
How Battery Soldiers started to fight the flames with portable extinguishers. The gunnery sergeant ran to How-25 and pulled the exterior fire suppression handle. A small puff indicated that at least some Halon was discharged, but this attempt to stop the blaze was futile. As flames grew inside the track, leaders began yelling for Soldiers to get out.
Camp Doha had a single battered fire truck, which arrived at 10:40 am, accompanied by some MPs. The firefighters also brought a water tanker. They shot water into the burning track and a few minutes later, Maj. Rick Lynch (regimental executive officer) arrived to take charge. He climbed onto How-25 with the hose and sprayed water down into the track through the open driver’s hatch.
The flames kept burning, and soon the fire truck ran dry. A trooper jumped into the water tanker and drove it in front of the FAASV. Connecting the hose, a firefighter again shot a water stream down through the driver’s hatch to try and cool the crew compartment. 7 The Soldiers kept fighting the fire knowing that time was running out.
Echo Troop tankers and scouts were working on their vehicles close by and watched the fire-fighting effort. One NCO in the troop later reported that he and his buddies weren’t overly concerned at first, because they figured that How-25’s fire suppression system would put out the fire. They realized the situation was serious when the first internal explosion rocked the FAASV. 8
The order went out to evacuate the hardstand. The fire crew left the tanker with the hose streaming water into the burning vehicle as more internal explosions occurred. Troopers ran to put distance between them and the burning vehicle. At around 11:07 am, How-25 exploded. The 155mm rounds inside the track were blasted apart, showering nearby vehicles with a barrage of exploding submunitions, white phosphorous, and shell fragments.
