Rain of steel on the Blackhorse

Steel rain

A catastrophic chain reaction began as one after another, M109s and FAASVs were hit. Artillery tracks carrying high explosive and white phosphorous rounds exploded. Within minutes, the hardstand was engulfed in flame, noise and smoke.

Most of the Soldiers in the nearby buildings had no idea what was happening on the hardstand. One was sleeping in a warehouse when a .50 caliber machine gun came crashing down through the sheetmetal roof and hit the floor not ten feet away. Many people heard the first explosions and looked out to see what was going on.

Chris Sauls served as the driver for Combat Support Squadron’s (Packhorse) commander. He was monitoring the radio traffic that morning in his Humvee and sensed the urgency as the fire crew had been working stop the fire. When How-25 exploded, Sauls watched as large bay doors were knocked off their tracks. The blast rocked the building he was parked next to and he saw through the gaping holes that interior partitions had collapsed. ₉

Another Soldier had just come off guard duty and was sleeping on his cot in a warehouse. An explosion woke him up and he walked outside to find out what had happened. He saw a dozen people coming toward him. Figuring it wasn’t his problem, he tried to go back to sleep. A few minutes later, a second, much larger blast rocked the building, blowing all the windows in. Realizing the situation was serious, he pulled on his flak jacket and helmet.

The hardstand was blanketed with what looked like an intensive artillery barrage and the ground rocked from heavy explosions. Shock waves battered the camp’s sheet metal buildings, and chunks of metal flew through the air in all directions. One Soldier was 1,000 feet from the hardstand when a piece of falling debris struck him in the head.

Echo Troop’s combat vehicles were parked on the hardstand across from How Battery’s vehicle line, exposed to the full brunt of the catastrophe. With combat loads of forty 120mm rounds each, tanks began to burn, followed within seconds by wave after wave of deep internal explosions.

What the hell is happening?

Further away, more Soldiers heard the noise and looked outside. They saw a flood of people running toward them, and away from the mayhem. Giant fireballs blossomed in the bright summer sky as fuel tanks ruptured and ignited. Some Soldiers thought at first that Doha was under attack, or that a mortar barrage was causing the explosions. Confusion reigned and many people had no idea what to do.

Richard Jackson was a unit supply specialist with the Packhorse. His troop was drawing desert boots in a warehouse when: ₁₀

… all of a sudden from a distance, we heard a loud sonic boom. Not knowing where it originated from or what had caused it, I looked around to see if everyone was okay. With a minimum time to react, we ran outside to see what was going on. Above the building was a large shadow that resembled a mushroom cloud. At [f]irst, I though the Iraqis had attacked us and we had no way of defending ourselves because our arms were kept clear across post.

So, without further hesitation, we took off running towards the unit area. With glass and metal falling everywhere, the five-minute trip across post seemed like hours. The blazing desert temperature made [r]unning nearly impossible; as our mouths felt dry and our lungs burned from the heat and sand. Upon arrival to our unit we found the building empty and unsecured. Mainly because everyone had been told to evacuate due to the falling debris. Suddenly, from out of know [sic] where, an [o]fficer from the [r]egimental headquarters ran into the building and told us to get out. 

Combat vehicles, large pallets, and nearby shipping containers were stacked full of small arms ammunition and explosive ordnance. Soon, these munitions began cooking off. Explosive rounds and other debris were thrown high into the air, falling everywhere on Camp Doha and the surrounding areas. Streets and parking lots were quickly covered with unexploded ordnance. When Soldiers later returned to their buildings, they found that the roofs had been pierced by falling ammunition and all sorts of junk, leaving their living areas in shambles.

Soldiers and civilian workers ran for their lives through the rain of steel. They hurried because of the danger behind them. But now they confronted a maze of extremely sensitive dud ammunition laying everywhere on the ground. They were forced to carefully pick their way through these random minefields.

Depleted uranium

The temperature inside a burning combat vehicle can easily reach 2,000 degrees (F) or higher. In that incandescent blast furnace, everything is fuel – everything. The tanks carried depleted uranium (DU) ammunition, called sabot rounds. Depleted uranium is extremely hard. It’s one of the densest known metals, making it the ideal choice for tank-killing rounds. DU melts at 2,100 degrees (F). ₁₁

The 22nd Support Command (22nd SupCom) supported American and allied units in Kuwait. At noon, their headquarters recorded: ₁₂

Entire 2 Squadron motor pool has been affected by the fire. 35-40 vehicles on fire, to include entire How Battery. Battery has 155mm ammo uploaded. Depleted uranium rounds are going off. … 

The prevailing wind that day was from of the northwest, pushing hot air out of the desert. Rising hundreds of feet into the sky, the smoke blew across Camp Doha and over Kuwait City. Soldiers knew that smoke from combat vehicle fires contained toxic material. But no one at Camp Doha knew they were breathing depleted uranium carried on the wind.

As tank ammo burned and exploded, DU penetrators were thrown across the 2nd Squadron hardstand. Some also landed across the fence in 1st Squadron’s hardstand. Many of the penetrators were intact, but others had been blown to pieces. Some simply disappeared in the maelstrom. At 1430, 22nd SupCom recorded: ₁₃

Explosive Ordnance Disposal Point of Contact states that burning depleted uranium puts off alpha radiation. Uranium particles when breathed can be hazardous. 11ACR has been notified to treat the area as though it were a chemical hazard area; i.e. stay upwind and wear protective mask in the vicinity. 

No one in the 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment ever received that notification about radiation hazards.

After

By mid-afternoon, the worst of this explosive conflagration had tapered off, although ammunition continued cooking off sporadically throughout the night. The 2nd Squadron hardstand was a burned out wasteland, still too hot to approach. As the sun was setting, a Bradley from 1st Squadron was sent with hatches closed to survey the extent of the damage.

Driving slowly along the perimeter of 2nd Squadron’s hardstand, the crew and an explosive ordnance specialist observed the impact area. Driver Barry Grauel had a tough time seeing in the dim light, and moved the Bradley forward ever so slowly, one trackpad at a time. The dirt road was littered with submunitions and other ordnance. After going only a few hundred meters, the crew was forced by the dangerous ground to cautiously back out. ₁₄

The 2nd Squadron hardstand was the epicenter of destruction and the worst damage was concentrated in the area adjacent to How Battery’s track line. Echo Troop’s tanks and Bradleys were parked across the driveway from How, and many of these vehicles were either damaged or destroyed.

Nearly every building on Doha sustained minor damage, and the entire camp was covered with all sorts of debris and parts. Most dangerously, dud ordnance – from hand grenades to mortar rounds – littered the ground everywhere. Although the heaviest concentrations were close to the hardstand, all of Camp Doha was a danger area until cleared by EOD and Blackhorse combat engineers.

The submunitions were by far the most dangerous debris. FASCAMs and DPICM grenades lay everywhere in and around the 2nd Squadron hardstand. Thousands had rained from the sky, many failing to detonate on impact, either by design or malfunction. Explosive shocks and extreme heat had damaged these munitions, leaving them very sensitive and unstable. Soldiers were warned not to touch anything on the ground.

Fifty Soldiers (sources vary) were wounded on 11 July, and more would follow in the coming weeks. Miraculously, no one was killed that day, but about two weeks later, three Soldiers died while clearing unexploded munitions. They were explosive ordnance specialists Sgt. 1st Class Donald T. Murphy, Jr., and Staff Sgt. Ricky L. Bunch, and Pfc. Joshua J. Fleming of the 58th Combat Engineer Company, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment. 

The explosions and fires damaged or destroyed more than 100 vehicles, including four M1A1 tanks. US $15 million worth of ammunition was destroyed or permanently damaged, including at least 660 120mm depleted uranium penetrators. Camp Doha’s infrastructure sustained significant damage. (15)

Grievously battered, the Blackhorse still had a job to do. Replacement equipment and ammunition flowed into Doha during the recovery. A brand new fire truck arrived to replace the old one destroyed on the hardstand. In short order, the regiment did what it has always done after a crisis; restored combat readiness and got on with the mission. In September 1991, the 11th ACR rotated back home to Germany, task accomplished. But the scars from that day endured.

Legacy

Soldiers almost always try to put a humorous twist on the harsh realities they confront. Blackhorse troopers began calling 11 July 1991 “the Doha dash” and the name has stuck through the years. It’s a funny moniker, but that day was deadly serious.

The rest of the Army didn’t really comprehend what had happened at Doha and many Blackhorse troopers found it too hard to talk about. And after leaving the Army, they confronted the same situation with the VA. Most Americans – including VA healthcare workers – didn’t have a clue about the accident, or what it had done to survivors.

When veterans began filing disability claims for physical injuries, illnesses and PTSD based on the Doha disaster, many were denied and had to endure years of appeals. Since they had not technically served in combat, VA decision-makers often doubted the validity of their cases.

Possibly the most insidious residue of the disaster was posed by depleted uranium (DU). For many years following the Gulf War, the Department of Defense (DoD) insisted there was no long-term health effect from exposure to DU. During the cleanup at Doha, Soldiers handled many DU rounds without protective equipment. No one ever told them the ammo was hazardous, so they saw it as just another piece of metal to police up. Decades later, the Army finally admitted that a few Soldiers from the Gulf War era might – just might – have been exposed to very low levels of radioactivity from DU. But DoD still insists that DU is not hazardous to Soldiers.

Incredibly, the Army never conducted an environmental assessment after the accident. But over the years, DoD and the Kuwaiti Government began to recognize that Camp Doha was contaminated. In 2005, the Army closed Doha, and returned the facilities to Kuwait, but not before quietly doing the long overdue environmental impact study.

As a result of the study, the Kuwaiti Ministry of Defense contracted with a U.S. company to remove DU-contaminated soil from the Doha property. In 2008, the contractor excavated 6,700 tons of contaminated dirt, loaded it aboard a ship, and transported it to a remote site near Grand View, Idaho. Sealed into the ground, that toxic waste will sit forever. ₁₆

Blackhorse forever

I first learned of the Doha disaster through the Blackhorse grapevine in 1991. Rumors and whispers floated around the armor community about what had happened. The accident investigation took years to complete, and no one has ever written a definitive account of that day’s events and the aftermath.

This is a story that I’ve wanted to write for a very long time. While doing research, I reached out to the regiment’s Doha survivors to capture their stories. Only a handful were willing to share their stories of July 11th. As a combat veteran, I totally understand that most of my Blackhorse brothers keep their memories locked away.

If you are a Doha survivor, I appeal to you. Please, if you don’t tell the story of what happened that day, no one will. Even DoD sources offer conflicting information on the cause of the accident and how events unfolded. You and your battle buddies lived through one of the U.S. Army’s most fateful days. Your story is an important part of Blackhorse history.

Accident reports always focus on what went wrong. I would like to humbly offer a different take on the Doha disaster. It could have happened to any combat unit under similar circumstances. The loss of even a single Soldier is a tragedy. Three died during the clearing work after the events of July 11th 1991. But hundreds of Soldiers were on the hardstand that day, and not one died in the inferno. That is a testament to leadership, sound decision-making, and courage.

Never forget,
Mark

P.S. I want to especially thank Barry Grauel and Chris Sauls for sharing their memories with me. Their kind assistance has made my narrative a much better story.

Notes: 

Except for a handful of articles with fleeting mention, there are no first-person accounts of Soldiers’ experiences from 11 July 1991. Fortunately, there is a wealth of official information accessible at GulfLink. Many documents that were part of the Army accident investigation are available there. But since the focus on GulfLink is on DU exposure, there is almost no information from junior Soldiers, NCOs, and company grade officers about what happened on a micro-level. Nevertheless, I could not have written this story with access to GulfLink.

1. Spec. Winn’s comment is contained an article titled “Far-off War has Blackhorse Champing at Bit” by John Millar, page five of the European Stars and Stripes issue of 24 February 1991.
2. Col. Andrew Bacevich commanded the 11th ACR in Kuwait. In the following years, he gave interviews with an Army investigator about the accident. I used information from his statements in crafting this and the preceding paragraph.
3. In the 11th ACR, we unloaded our main gun ammunition when we went to our twice-per-year gunnery in Europe during the Cold War. Otherwise, the ammo stayed on the tanks and Bradleys.
4. Redleg is a nearly universal call sign for the artillery. It alludes to the red stripes artillerymen wore on their trouser seams in the 19th century.
5. This quote is from an interview with Capt. David Brown, Battery A, 2/17 Field Artillery, 212th Field Artillery from a 1991 episode of “Weapons of War.” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IroOVamQZHQ
6. Information on Z Element duties is found on the Blackhorse.org history page.
7. I relied on three sources in reconstructing the sequence of events on 11 July 1991: (1) the Army accident report of interview with the 11th ACR S-4 officer on 18 July 1991, (2) pages 1 and 2 of the AR 15-6 report of investigation of the incident dated 27 July 1991, and (3) the Army accident report interview with the 11th ACR XO dated 18 July 1991. These sources provide conflicting information about the FAASV’s on-board fire suppression system. The sources each document a slightly different chronology of events, but the essentials are similar in all three. Also, there is dispute whether the fire was related to a malfunctioning heater, versus a problem with the auxiliary power unit. Regardless of the source, the result was the same. Maj. Lynch was decorated with the Soldier’s Medal for his heroic actions on 11 July 1991, as were two other Soldiers: Staff Sgt. Charles Roger and Pvt. Eric Tomlinson.
8. Information extracted from an E 2/11 ACR NCO interview on 20 October 1997.
9. Phone interview with Chris Sauls, 10 August 2020. He also supplied further information about the evacuation efforts.
10. Information in this paragraph was extracted from a 2002 monograph titled “Operation Positive Force” by Sgt. Maj. Richard Jackson. The quoted passage is found on pages seven and eight.
11. The equivalent Centigrade temperature is 1,132 degrees. For a complete discussion of depleted uranium, read the report, “Properties, use and health effects of depleted uranium (DU): a general overview,” from Journal of Environmental Radioactivity.
12. 22nd Support Command daily journal entry, 1200, 11 July 1991.
13. 22nd Support Command daily journal entry, 1430, 11 July 1991.
14. The Bradley was C-32. Phone interview with Barry Grauel, 16 July 2020.
15. Munitions Safety Information Analysis Center information paper on the Doha disaster.
16. For information on the shipment of DU-contaminated dirt, see the Snake River Alliance press release of 1 May 1988. Time Magazine also reported on the shipment on 3 November 2008.  

Resources

This Tactical Explosives Safety slideshow provides a wealth of information of the destructive force of ammunition explosions.

Gulflink is the definitive resource for health concerns related to the Persian Gulf War. I consulted GulfLink extensively in preparing this story.

There is public Facebook group for veterans who were at Doha during the disaster.

This short video provides a concise overview of how the DPICM round works.