Task Force Smith was an ill-fated unit built around the nucleus of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry in the summer of 1950. As the North Korean Army rampaged into South Korea, the U.S. Army struggled mightily to mount a response. The first units pushed into the breach against this armored juggernaut were occupation forces that deployed directly into combat from their peacetime garrisons in Japan.
Lt. Col. Charles Bradford Smith commanded the task force that bore his name. Part of the 24th Infantry Division, Smith and his Soldiers were destined to be the first U.S. troops to face the North Korean communist army in 1950. A woefully understrength light infantry unit backed up by some artillery forces, Task Force Smith dug in on a hill near Osan, South Korea, about 45 kilometers south of Seoul.
On July 5th, 1950, the small force attempted to halt the advance of a North Korean combined arms attack by tanks and infantry of two divisions. During the ensuing battle, Lt. Col. Smith and his beleaguered Soldiers ended up in a fight for their lives. They fought the oncoming T-34/85 tanks with a shortage of World War II era bazookas and rockets. Some of the infantrymen lacked even basic loads of ammunition.
United Press reporter Peter Kalischer accompanied Task Force Smith into combat. Soon after the battle, he filed one of the war’s first dispatches describing ground combat by American troops. Appearing in national newspapers on Friday, July 7th, 1950, Kalischer’s report makes for for sobering reading:
… The battalion had barely maneuvered into position in the farthest American outpost some three miles north of Osan, 11 miles south of Suwon, at 8:15 a.m. Wednesday when the North Korean army launched its strongest tank attack of the war.
American artillery a half-mile back opened up on the tanks just as I reported in to the battalion commander Lt. Col. Charles B. Smith of Lambertville, N. J. Ten minutes later from a foxhole I saw the first Russian-made tanks rumble over the road I had taken to the command post. First one, then 10, then 20 Communist tanks rumbled past. They completely cut us off from our lines. I lost count after that.
The tanks began firing at the American artillery batteries which had range of the road. But so far as I could tell they scored no hits. The Communist tanks were in single file, like ducks in a shooting gallery. But they knew what they were about. They would pause before the target spot, wait until American batteries fired, then spurt on ahead. The American battalion, only two companies strong, opened up with everything it had from dominating heights north, south, east and southeast of the road.
The soldiers fired mortars, bazookas and new recoilless 75-millimeter rifles. But for the most part missiles bounced off like ping-pong balls. In the next five terrible hours before the withdrawal order, only three tanks were crippled. And it took daring bazooka teams running up within 50 yards of the Iron monsters to do it. Four hits on the treads put them out of action.
The gravity of the battalion’s position became evident an hour after the attack started. By then, tanks backed by North Korean artillery were challenging the American big gun positions to the south. Officers told me the Communist tanks fired 88-millimeter guns, (1) the all – purpose guns with which the Nazis punished U.S. troops during World War II. They said the tanks had new and tougher armor which made them virtually impervious to the American anti-tank equipment used that day. … (2)
In this horrible situation, the task force withdrew under intensive fire, leaving many dead behind. After the war, casualties were determined to be 60 dead, 21 wounded, and 82 captured. 30 of the prisoners died at the hands of the North Koreans – many of them murdered soon after surrendering. Unfortunately, the Soldiers of Task Force Smith could not stop or slow the operational tempo of the North Koreans, who used armored tactics taught to them by Soviet Army experts with combat experience in World War II.
Many authors, both in and out of the Army, later analyzed or assessed the performance of Task Force Smith negatively. Chief among the was T. R. Fehrenbach, who wrote disparagingly:
They had been told this was a police action, and that they’d be home soon in Japan. It was a happy thought – life in Japan was very good. Almost every man had his own shoeshine boy and his own musume (3) … The young men of Task Force Smith carried Regular Army serial numbers, but they were the new breed of American regular, who, not liking the service, had insisted, with public support, that the Army be made as much like civilian life and home as possible. …
… They had grown fat. … They were like American youth everywhere. They believed the things their society had taught them to believe. … It was not their fault that no one had told them that the real function of an army is to fight and that a soldier’s destiny–which few escape–is to suffer, and if need be, to die. (4)
Task Force Smith and U.S. Army readiness
Since the end of the Korean War in 1953, Task Force Smith has served as an example for U.S. Army on how not to fight the first battle of the next war. Frequently paired with the U.S. Army’s debacle at Kasserine Pass in February 1943, the Battle of Osan is often presented as a failure of unit leadership, courage, stamina, and the will to fight.
I served with the U.S. Army in Germany from 1985-89; in the closing years of the Cold War. During one year, the VII Army developed an ad campaign called “No more Task Force Smiths.” There were posters, lesson plans, and commercials on Armed Forces Network TV and radio. I was pretty far down the chain then, so I wasn’t privy to all of the specifics at higher echelons, but I remember that it was focused on us at the squad, team, platoon, and company level.
After the Cold War ended, the Army went full-in with the No more Task Force Smiths campaign. As I understand it, the initiative was backed by our then-Chief of Staff, General Gordon R. Sullivan. Some of the emphasis areas were realistic training and physical fitness. I’m sure you’ve heard the old mantra: “The more you sweat in training, the less you bleed in war.” Other parts of the campaign included material about intangibles such as fortitude and the will to fight.
During the 1990s, the Army also began developing concepts such as the Warrior Ethos, and the Soldier’s Creed. Their appeal to the Soldier’s spirit has struck a chord not just among Soldiers, but also with the American people. The most well-known tenet is the oft-repeated: “I will never leave a fallen comrade.”
I can’t say for sure that the creed and ethos arose arose specifically from the No more Task Force Smiths ad campaigns. But to my way of thinking, the campaign, the creed, and the ethos all share a common purpose: to reinforce and demand the highest level of conduct and performance in the test of fire. By not fighting like the Soldiers of Task Force Smith, modern Soldiers will do a better job in combat and accomplish their mission.
One tiny little niggling problem
Here’s the thing. An examination of Task Force Smiths actual performance in combat disputes the concepts that the Army’s various campaigns and initiatives were supposed to address. When Lt. Col. Smith received his deployment orders in late June 1950, he was only able to taken a below-strength infantry battalion into combat. Most of his Soldiers volunteered for the assignment. The task force deployed by air to Korea to Japan, and that seriously limited the number of Soldiers in the task force.
Contrary to the perception that Soldiers in Japan had grown soft during occupation duty, Task Force Smith was a well-trained and well-led unit. Given the fiscal constraints that confronted the post-World War II Army, the Soldiers were trained as well as possible. In 1999, Major John Garrett, U.S. Army, made a comprehensive study of 1/21 Infantry’s performance in combat. An experienced infantry officer, he wrote:
The conclusion that the soldiers stationed in Japan were soft is not based upon fact but … on anecdotal evidence. Soldiers are not soft or unprepared because they are interested in girlfriends or have someone polish their shoes. The result of the battles involving the 24th Infantry Division and Task Force Smith in 1950 was so shocking to American military leaders that there had to be some reason for such a defeat. … Unfortunately, they picked the simplest, and least controversial cause of defeat and in doing so buried the real cause of the failure. (5)
Reflecting on the fate of Task Force Smith, I can’t help but believe that hubris played an important role in the defeat. Before the invasion, no one important on our side ever even thought a North Korean attack possible. When that unlikely scenario came true, their tanks blasted through South Korean defenses. The small South Korean Army (not really an army, but more of a constabulary) could not blunt the enemy offensive.
A school of thought took hold at headquarters in Tokyo (aka General MacArthur), that an American troop commitment would scare Kim Il Sung and his Chinese and Soviet masters so badly, they would give up their invasion and go home. Except that the communists apparently didn’t get that memorandum.
blitzkrieg in South Korea
Most historians opine that the Germany army was the ultimate practitioner of lightning war. It goes beyond the scope of this article, but I disagree. In 1944-45 the U.S. Army in Europe practiced blitzkrieg at a level of expertise the vaunted German never matched even in their halcyon days. So U.S. commanders in 1950 should have understood the logical conclusion of sending two rifle companies against two North Korean divisions.
Maj. Gen. William F. Dean commanded the 24th Infantry Division when he was ordered to deploy a task force to Korea. He was also preparing to mount out the entire division, understrength as it was and lacking much equipment. Divisional G-2 had no intelligence to brief or orient Lt. Col. Smith about the ground situation in Korea. In the movement order to Lt. Col. Smith, General Dean instructed:
When you get to Pusan, head for Taejon. We want to stop the North Koreans as far from Pusan as we can. Block the main road as far north as possible. Make contact with General Church. If you can’t find him, go to Taejon and beyond if you can. Sorry I can’t give you more information—that’s all I’ve got. Good luck, and God bless you and your men! (6)
On arrival in Korea, Lt. Col. Smith reported to Maj. Gen John Church, interim commander on the ground. Church issued the following combat order:
We have a little action up here. All we need is some men who won’t run when they see tanks. We’re going to move you up to support the ROKs and give them moral support.(7)
I don’t know about you, but these are the sketchiest combat orders I’ve ever heard of.
You gotta find someone to blame
While the war was going on, no one really got into the blame game about the debacle in 1950. There were plenty more setbacks and tragedy to come during the ensuing years in Korea. Lt. Col. Smith received a well-merited Distinguished Service Cross and went on to command the 21st Infantry Regiment. Maj. Gen. Dean was a heroic commander who was captured in direct combat and spent three years in a North Korean POW camp. Obviously, no one was going to blame General MacArthur. He was beyond reproach, or even questioning.
The 24th Infantry Division (including Task Force Smith) received the Presidential Unit Citation for its heroic defense of South Korea in the face of overwhelming force. Nevertheless, historians have excoriated the division and its Soldiers, many of whom gave their lives in that long hot summer of 1950. On the other hand, some modern Soldiers have recognized the fallacy of these assessments:
… {h}istorians blamed the appalling losses and demoralizing defeats of 5-20 July on poor training, poor equipment, and lazy, ill-disciplined soldiers of an occupation army. This is a simplistic and remarkably linear understanding of the causes of what happened to the 24th Infantry Division. (8)
Considering the terrible situation they confronted in combat, the Soldiers of Task Force Smith performed bravely. They didn’t just bug out at the first sight of enemy tanks. Mr. Kalischer’s eyewitness report refutes that entire line of thought. Lt. Col. Smith and his subordinate leaders did not exercise poor leadership. To the contrary. He was decorated after the operations with America’s second highest award for valor.
the real culprits
Two unsupported rifle companies could never hope to defeat a major armored thrust. To me as a historian and retired Soldier, the miracle was that anyone in the task force survived at all. The real fault for the defeat did not lie anywhere within the ranks of 1st Battalion, 21st Infantry or their attached artillery battery. From the moment they were alerted for combat, Lt. Col. Smith and his Soldiers had been set up for failure.
No tanks accompanied the task force into combat. The infantrymen lacked effective tank-killing systems. Without antitank mines or barbed wire, they fought with what they had; World War II bazookas, and a handful of recoilless rifles. It was not enough to stop the T-34/85 tanks of the North Korean Army. Post-World War II Army doctrine had emphasized that the best weapon to kill enemy tanks was friendly tanks. Task Force Smith had none, and American Soldiers paid for that shortcoming, among others, with their lives.
Conceit played a role in the defeat. Senior commanders in Tokyo expected that the North Koreans would not attack American troops, and that just by showing up on the battlefield, Lt. Col. Smith and his Soldiers would force the enemy to break off his attacks. In reality, the task force acted as little more than a speed bump.
the real heroes
The situation in Korea was dire when the 24th Infantry Division was first committed into the breach, suffering casualties on a level not seen since the invasion of Iwo Jima in 1945. (9) The division made one stand after another in those long-ago July days of 1950, and traded lives for time. At each juncture, divisional elements were committed piecemeal with little consideration of the operational imperatives.
Task Force Smith was a heroic unit, as was the entire 24th I.D. We ought to honor those young Soldiers who sacrificed so much for not one country, but two. In the decades since the war, we have learned the wrong lessons from their sacrifice. Lt. Col. Smith and his troops were not a bunch of untrained semi-cowards that ran at the first sign of trouble, although they are often portrayed that way by self-serving historians.
Like Soldiers of every generation, the task force did the best it could with the weapons and equipment available. They gave everything they had. Lt. Col. Smith and his troops were not the reason the Battle of Osan was lost. That engagement was lost before they ever set foot on the battle position where they tried to do the impossible.
Task Force Smith, never forget,
Mark
Notes
- Mr. Kalischer wrote that the North Korean tanks were equipped with 88mm main guns. The T-34/85 was actually equipped with the Soviet 85mm dual-purpose tank cannon.
- Passage extracted from the United Press dispatch “Five terrible hours in tank battle” by Peter Kalischer. I found the article on page two of the July 7th, 1950 edition of The Chicago Daily News.
- Musume is a Japanese word meaning girl or daughter. In slang, it can also mean a young, unmarried woman. Mr. Fehrenbach likely used the word in reference to girlfriends.
- The cited passed is from pages 122-123 of This Kind of War: a Study in Unpreparedness by T. R. Fehrenbach. MacMillan Publishers, 1963.
- The cited passage is from pages 24-25 of Task Force Smith – the Lesson Never Learned by Major John D. Garrett, U.S. Army. Command and General Staff College monograph, 1999.
- This order is cited on page 55 of Korea – The First War We Lost by Bevin Alexander. Hippocrene Books, New York, 1986.
- Ibid. Page 56.
- The cited passage is from page n1 of Task Force Smith and the 24th Infantry Division in Korea, July 1950 by Major Raymond M. Longabaugh, U.S. Army. Command and General Staff College monograph, 2014. The author presents the most effective summation that I have read of the circumstances surrounding the task force’s commitment into battle.
- Ibid. For a comparative discussion on 24th I.D. losses in the summer of 1950, see page one.